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The Limits of Fiduciary Duties in Business Organizations:  
the Evidence from Limited Partnerships in the US and UK 
Chi Zhang∗ 
 
Abstract 
The development of fiduciary duty regime in the commercial law in Anglo-American countries has 
experienced more than one hundred years. Although fiduciary duty rules have been widely applied 
in business organizations for enhancing investor protection, the connotation and practice of 
fiduciary duties in modern commercial world are being changed dramatically during the recent 
decades. This article aims at exploring the functions and limits of fiduciary duties in business 
organization laws by carrying out detailed research on the institutional evolution of fiduciary 
duties in the limited partnership laws of the United States and United Kingdom. By both 
theoretical and practical analysis of fiduciary duties, this article emphasizes that any legal 
technique has its limits and boundary and the institutional advantages of fiduciary law can be well 
realized by alternative institutional arrangements; and any abuse of using fiduciary law in 
business organizations will decrease efficiency, and the legal transplantation of fiduciary law may 
also be costly in the destination countries outside common law jurisdiction.  
 
1 Introduction 
The fiduciary duty regime is regarded by common-law scholars as an efficient and effective legal 
institution for cutting transaction costs in organized business activities, since the case-by-case 
practice of the courts can flexibly fill the gap between the market participants and then save the 
contractual costs of negotiating in commercial enterprises.1 However, any legal institution has its 
own limits. In other words, the fiduciary duty as a practical legal technique for protecting 
                                                        
∗ Dr. Chi Zhang, Lecturer in Commercial Law at School of Law and Humanities of China University of 
Mining and Technology (Beijing). Ph.D. in Law, The University of Glasgow; LL.M. and LL.B., 
Tsinghua University. E-mail: thuzhangchi@163.com. The author acknowledges with gratitude 
Professor Iain G. MacNeil from The University of Glasgow for his insightful comments on this 
research.  
1 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 
(Harvard University Press 1991) 90-108. 
investors also has its limitation and any abuse of fiduciary law in business organizations may also 
be inefficient.  
 
This article aims to explore the limits and boundary of fiduciary duties in business organization 
laws by reviewing and analyzing its evolution in the reform of limited partnership legislation of 
the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). In the second section of this article, the 
economic functions of fiduciary duties will be examined briefly; the following section will discuss 
the basic principle and evolution of fiduciary duties in the limited partnerships of the US and UK, 
by which the changing attitude towards managing partners’ duties can be displayed. Based on the 
above theoretical discussion of fiduciary duties and practical study on the limited partnership laws 
in the US and UK, this article will points out the limitation of fiduciary duties in the context of 
transaction cost economics and its practical implication.  
 
2 Fiduciary Duty as Default Rules: the Economic Functions 
 
Based on the contractual theory of the firm, the governance rules of the firm mainly depend on the 
agreement between the parties.2 Theoretically, contractual parties can optimize the governance 
structure by drafting specific contractual provisions, by which all circumstances will be predicted 
and stipulated in contracts. In fact, it is impossible to predict all the contingencies in future and 
even if it were possible, the costs of drafting such contracts would be insufferable; that is to say, 
the contract of the firm would be incomplete. In such circumstances, the primary issues that need 
to be considered is how to deal with the uncertainty generated from the incompleteness of firms’ 
contracts.  
 
As a response to the uncertainties, two main approaches may be useful. The first is that the 
legislators are expected to draft more detailed statutes to provide solutions for the parties in the 
market in advance. However, aside from the problematic feasibility, owing to the complexity and 
volatility of business in modern society, over-detailed legislation may seriously weaken the 
                                                        
2 See details of the contractual theory of the firm: Henry N. Butler, ‘The Contractual Theory of the 
Corporation’ (1989) 11 (4) George Mason University Law Review 99. 
legislative flexibility and adaptability in real commercial world. Additionally, no matter how 
accurate the written laws can be, it is difficult to avoid the vagueness of definition in the statutes. 
For example, different parties may have different understandings of the same term in a law; or a 
given circumstance may lie out the definition provided by the present legislation;3 in other words, 
it is obvious that pursuing the completeness of legislation is not efficient.  
 
The second approach to addressing the uncertainties in commercial law is external intervention 
and remedies. In the context of common law jurisdictions, fiduciary duties as default rules 
developed by the judiciary play an underlying role in dealing with the uncertainty in business law. 
In general, the fiduciary duty is one of the core concepts in business organizations of the 
Anglo-American jurisdiction. Although the fiduciary duties generally can be summarized as the 
duty of care and duty of loyalty which are imposed on persons such as the director in the company, 
the trustee of the trust fund or the managing partner in a partnership, the precise meaning of the 
fiduciary duties might not be understood correctly without a reference to the voluminous case law.  
 
From an economic point of view, the fiduciary duty system plays a role as a gap-filler for reducing 
or correcting the uncertainties in incomplete contracts, in which the contractual parties can spend 
more time on issues for their own specific needs and leave the broader issues to the court.4 
Moreover, judicial sanctions against a manager’s breach of fiduciary duties also convince the 
parties of the firms that the external pressure of fiduciary duties is able to supervise the managers 
effectively to perform properly.5 In summary, the application of fiduciary duties has provided a 
flexible and costless way to extend the freedom of participants in transactions and to improve 
economic efficiency of business organizations.  
 
3 The Fiduciary Duty of General Partners in Limited Partnerships of the United States 
Generally speaking, the fiduciary duties of a general partner in a limited partnership of the US 
                                                        
3 Iain G. MacNeil, ‘Uncertainty in Commercial Law’ (2009) 13 Edinburgh Law Review 68, 76. 
4 Iain G. MacNeil, ‘Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective of Incomplete Contract 
Theory’ (2001) 1 (1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 107, 119. 
5 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 1) 92.  
means that the law refrains general partners (GPs) from 1) appropriating any limited partnership’s 
opportunities for his/her own sakes and 2) competing with the limited partnership he/she is 
managing and 3) dealing with the limited partnership’s any business on behalf of another party 
with an adverse interest and 4) exceeding the authority granted to him/her in the partnership 
agreement to dispose the limited partnership’s property. In practice, however, the connotation of 
the above rules has been changed through ages.  
 
The Highest Standard of Loyalty: Cadorzo’s Principle 
In the history of the US partnership law, the basic principle of the fiduciary duties of a managing 
partner initially emerged from Meinhard v Salmon (1928), a case appealed to New York Appeal 
Court. Salmon, the defendant obtained a twenty-year lease on a building owned by a third party, 
and the parties agreed to change the building from a hotel to shops. In order to finance the venture, 
Salmon entered into a joint venture, in which Meinhard would provide the investment capital, 
Salmon would manage the business, and the profit would be shared between them. When the lease 
was about to run out, the property owner approached the defendant to offer him an opportunity to 
lease a much larger real estate, including the current building. By the end of the joint venture, 
Salmon entered into a new lease between himself and the owner without informing the plaintiff.6 
Then Meinhard sued Salmon for the breach of the venture agreement and finally won the lawsuit 
in New York Appeal Court.  
 
In the majority opinion of the court, Cardozo J held that co-venturers (partners) ‘owe to one 
another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of finest loyalty’.7 What’s more, in most cases of 
joint ventures or business partnerships, co-operation is mainly based on the high level mutual faith 
among each partner, therefore, judge Cardozo further decided that ‘not honesty alone, but the 
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive is then the standard of behaviour’. 8  Therefore, 
partnerships or joint ventures are much more closed and private-trust-based than other business 
organizations. Any individual partner mustn’t take advantages of opportunities or interest without 
                                                        
6 Meinhard v Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-4, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
informing other partners, even though the above duties may not be clearly expressed in a 
partnership agreement. 
 
Judge Cardozo’s opinion affects profoundly, hereafter, for more than half a century in the US 
courts, hundreds of the cases regarding the fiduciary duties in partnership law cited Cardozo’s 
opinion as the reason for judgement. As a result, in the US partnership law cases, a breach of 
fiduciary duty can occur by something less than fraud or intentional bad faith.9  
 
The Equitable Duty of General Partners of Limited Partnerships   
Ever since Cardozo’s decision was popularly accepted in the US courts, the case law of 
partnerships, especially US laws of limited partnerships have been developed in the direction of 
imposing strict equitable duty of loyalty on managing partners. In the Delaware case, Boxer v. 
Husky Oil Co.(1981),10 Husky Exploration Limited (HE.Ltd) was a limited partnership that 
invested in oil and mineral resources. Pursuant to the Partnership Agreement, Husky Petroleum 
Corporation (HP.Co), the general partner (GP) was granted an option to purchase the interests of 
all the limited partners (LPs), the GP was entitled to assign the option to another. By the expiry 
date of the limited partnership agreement, the GP assigned the interests of two investments of the 
limited partnership to Husky Oil Company (HO.Co), the controlling shareholder of the HP.Co, in 
the values of $10m and $78480 respectively. However, such two deals was considered by the LPs 
as extremely unfair. The plaintiffs filed to the Court of Chancery of Delaware and alleged that the 
GP had breached its fiduciary duty to the LPs by standing on both sides of the transactions.11  
 
The primary dispute in this case was that if the remedy was full by the statutes, whether a lawsuit 
regarding fiduciary duties can be accepted by the Court of Chancery. Although the Delaware 
Code12 excludes the equitable jurisdiction of a case in which sufficient remedy can be satisfied by 
other statutes such as contract law, or common law. Nevertheless, the court held that: 
                                                        
9 Robert Thompson, ‘The Story of Meinhard v. Salmon and Fiduciary Duty's Punctilio’ (October 16, 
2008) Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 08-44. 
10 Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., 429 A.2d 995, 997 (Del. Ch. 1981). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Del.C. § 342 stipulates that ‘The Court of Chancery shall not have jurisdiction to determine any 
 ‘The statute, 10 Del.C. § 342, being a mere declaration of the ancient rule of equity, neither 
grants nor divests equity of any jurisdiction …… the Court of Chancery has historically 
entertained suits seeking an accounting by fiduciaries and the General Assembly has not enacted 
any statute transferring that jurisdiction to another court, therefore this Court has jurisdiction 
over this matter’.  
 
It is intriguing that although the damages can be recovered by contract law, the US court insisted 
to impose fiduciary duty on GPs of limited partnerships, which has obviously displayed a strict 
attitude towards the obligations of the GP in limited partnerships.  
 
Restricting the Fiduciary Duty: the Reforms of the US Partnership Legislations 
Although fiduciary duties in trust law and corporation law are still statutory, in terms of limited 
partnership law, the US legislators have permitted the parties of limited partnerships to restrict or 
modify fiduciary duties of managing partners. Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
2000 ("DRULPA") establishes a model to cope with this issue, however, this also arouses ongoing 
debates pertaining to the fiduciary duty in the US partnership law.  
 
In the appealed case Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Partners (2002),13 Gatham Partners was the 
largest LP in the limited partnership Hallwood Partners L.P.. In accordance with the limited 
partnership agreement, Hallwood Realty Corporation, the sole GP was obliged to manage the 
business under the ‘entire fairness standard’ which required fair dealing and fair prices14 when 
the GP transacts the limited partnership units or assets with any third party. In a given transaction, 
however, the GP transferred 23.4% of limited partnership units to its owner, Hallwood Group 
Incorporated (HGI) in an inadequate price and eventually enhanced HGI’s control over the limited 
partnership. Hence, Gotham Partners claimed to the Court of Chancery that the general partner has 
                                                                                                                                                              
matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any other court or 
jurisdiction of this State’. 
13 Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Partners, 817 A.2d 160 (Del. 2002).  
14 Ibid. 
breached its fiduciary duty.15 The court decided that there was no doubt that the GP has breached 
the contractual fiduciary duty, however, pursuant to Section 17-1101(d) (2) of the DRULPA16, the 
fiduciary duty has been moved to an obligation under contract law, rather than equitable rules. 
Therefore, the Court of Chancery was unable to offer any equitable remedy to the plaintiff. 
Gotham Partners then appealed to the Supreme Court of Delaware. 
 
The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the trial court’s decision with the reason that although 
Section 17-1101(d) (2) of the DRULPA gives contractual freedom to the partners of limited 
partnerships: ‘There is no mention in, or elsewhere in DRULPA……that a limited partnership 
agreement may eliminate the fiduciary duties or liabilities of a general partner’,17 the equitable 
remedy therefore, should be applicable to this case.  
 
This leading case in limited partnership law shows that the US court firstly articulated that the 
fiduciary duty of GPs in limited partnerships is unshakable and irremovable. Even if the revised 
law of limited partnerships of the US allows parties to modify the duties of GPs, in consideration 
of the close personal co-operation between GPs and LPs, there is no reason to construe that the 
statute has eliminated the equitable fiduciary duty of managing partners.  
 
The problem is that though the US case law has the discretion to affirm that fiduciary duty should 
not be eliminated from law of limited partnerships, however, the written legislation doesn’t 
exactly clarify it. What’s more, the issue that in what degree the parties are allowed to modify or 
even waive fiduciary duties by creating contractual provisions of limited partnership agreements, 
was sparked by private equity limited partnership funds in the US during the recent decade.  
 
Blackstone L.P.: Eliminating Fiduciary Duty on GPs? 
The Delaware General Assembly amended the law of limited partnerships in 2004 and clearly 
                                                        
15 Ibid. 
16 Section 17-1101(d) (2) of the DRULPA states: ‘the partner's or other person's duties and liabilities 
may be expanded or restricted by provisions in the partnership agreement’. 
17 Ibid. 
permitted partners to contractually eliminate any partners’ fiduciary duty in limited partnership 
agreements.18 Private equity (PE) is a ‘private club’ for big-money players who are commonly 
sophisticated and qualified institutional investors, hence the activities of PE funds are out of 
regulatory preview. As a typical closed-end investment fund, the liquidity in PE funds is 
inadequate, going to public will substantially expand the way of assembling capitals for PE firms. 
As a basic legal principle in corporation law and securities regulation, directors must assume 
fiduciary duty to public companies, similarly, for protecting public investors, any listed firms must 
satisfy the strict ongoing disclosure and transparency requirements. As to listed limited 
partnerships, unexpectedly, the managers’ fiduciary duty can be fully eliminated by limited 
partnership agreement (LPA), as a consequence, however, limited partners may be exposed to 
higher opportunistic risk in fund management.  
 
In practice, Blackstone Group Inc. as one of the leading private equity tycoons in the world, may 
illustrate some important changes in practice of limited partnership law. For instance, Section 7 of 
the Blackstone Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership (June 2007)19 displays 
how general partners in a listed PE limited partnership can considerably eschew the bind of 
fiduciary duty under the existing Delaware LP law:  
 
Firstly, the duty of loyalty has been eliminated by the Blackstone LPA. The s7.1(a) evidently 
entitles the GP ‘full power and authority to do all the things ……in its sole discretion’20 and s7.9 
(b) further makes a wide range of justification to give GP powerful ‘sole discretion’.21 The 
                                                        
18 See Section 17-1101(d)(2)(d), Ch17, Title 6 of the Revised Delaware Code. 
19 Details and full text of Blackstone’s Agreement which has been approved by SEC is available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1393818/000104746907005223/a2178627zex-3_1.htm. 
Hereinafter, the ‘Blackstone LPA’ 
20 Ibid.s7.1(a). 
21 Ibid.s7.9(b). It was stated that ‘the General Partner, …… is permitted to or required to make a 
decision in its "sole discretion" …… shall be entitled to consider only such interests and factors as it 
desires, including its own interests, and shall have no duty or obligation (fiduciary or otherwise) to 
give any consideration to any interest of or factors affecting the Partnership or the Partners, and shall 
not be subject to any other or different standards imposed by this Agreement, any other agreement 
contemplated hereby, under the Delaware Limited Partnership Act or under any other law, rule or 
regulation or in equity. Whenever in this Agreement or any other agreement contemplated hereby or 
problem is that such a provision has publicly asserted that the GP in a public LP can not only fully 
exclude any LPs’ intervention but also make any decisions by considering the interests including 
GP’s own stake, whereas there is no restriction requiring the GP to give a priority to the interests 
of limited partners in decision-making. At the same time, s7.5(c) of the Blackstone LPA clearly 
states that ‘the doctrine of corporate opportunity or other analogous doctrine shall not apply to 
any such Indemnitee ’,22 which denies the principle established by Cadorzo J and then gives a 
leeway to letting the GP appropriate the opportunity for its own sake.   
 
Secondly, in the situation of mergers, the Blackstone LPA also vests the GP a full power to make 
investment decisions without fiduciary duty to the limited partners. For example, s14.2 of the 
Blackstone LPA stipulates that: 
 
‘……merger, consolidation or other business combination of the Partnership pursuant to this 
Article XIV requires the prior consent of the General Partner, …… the General Partner shall have 
no duty or obligation to consent to any merger, consolidation or other business combination of the 
Partnership ……may decline to do so free of any duty (including any fiduciary duty) or obligation 
whatsoever to the Partnership’.23  
 
It can be believed that in deciding a vital transaction, such as mergers and acquisitions, the 
interests of LPs may be threatened by opportunism and the fate of the limited partnership might be 
exclusively determined by the GP.  
 
Finally, the Blackstone LPA also entitles a modification power to waive the fiduciary duty of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
otherwise the General Partner is permitted to or required to make a decision in its "good faith" then 
for purposes of this Agreement, the General Partner, or any of its Affiliates that cause it to make any 
such decision, shall be conclusively presumed to be acting in good faith if such Person or Persons 
subjectively believe(s) that the decision made or not made is in the best interests of the Partnership’. 
22 Ibid., s7.5(c). According to s1.1 Definitions, Indemnitees include the General Partner, departing GPs, 
affiliates of GPs or any members, officers, directors, employees, agents, trustees of the General Partner. 
The General Partner refers to Blackstone Group Management L.L.C, a Delaware LLC, who is the 
general partner of the Blackstone Group L.P. 
23 Ibid., s14.2. 
GP to the investors. In accordance with s7.9 (e) of this agreement, the GP is not imposed fiduciary 
duty to the limited partnership and all LPs bound by this agreement are agreed to replace such 
kind of duties or liabilities of the GP.24 This provision has an effect that the investors who agree 
to sign the LPA must voluntarily waive its equitable remedy. In current trends of PE industry of 
the Wall Street, such a radical and aggressive challenge to fiduciary principles has been adopted 
by an increasing number of PE firms in the US.25  
 
4 The Fiduciary Duties of General Partners of Limited Partnerships in the United Kingdom 
Generally speaking, the main connotation of duty of loyalty in partnership law is the good faith 
principle. Although the Partnership Act 1890 of the UK provides that the duties and rights of 
partners in a partnership can be freely determined and revised by the consent of all the partners, 
the basic rule of duty of good faith regulating the partners’ conducts in partnerships has been 
developed in case law and the application of any rules waiving the duty of loyalty in partnership 
agreement was void.26  
 
Firstly, duty of loyalty means that the equal use and access to the partnership’s information and 
records between the partners is required. In the cases, Floydd v Cheney(1970)27 and Finlayson v 
Turnbull(No.1,1997)28, the leaving or resigned partners exclusively occupied the confidential 
                                                        
24 Ibid., s7.9 (e). it is provided as follows: ‘Except as expressly set forth in this Agreement, to the 
fullest extent permitted by law, neither the General Partner nor any other Indemnitee shall have any 
duties or liabilities, including fiduciary duties, to the Partnership, any Limited Partner or any other 
Person bound by this Agreement, and the provisions of this Agreement, to the extent that they restrict 
or otherwise modify or eliminate the duties and liabilities, including fiduciary duties, of the General 
Partner or any other Indemnitee otherwise existing at law or in equity, are agreed by the Partners to 
replace such other duties and liabilities of the General Partner or such other Indemnitee’. 
25 In fact, Blackstone is only one of the listed PE partnerships, during 2006-2007, several PE and 
hedge fund tycoons such as KKR&Co.L.P. and GLG Partners also went public in NYSE. In May 2012, 
Carlyle Group.L.P., another leading PE firm, was listed in Nasdaq with an offer amount of $0.67billion. 
Available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aStPTvZ7Eef8&refer=home and 
http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/ipos/company/carlyle-group-lp-863136-68088. 
26 Geoffrey Morse, Partnership Law (7th edn OUP 2010) 161-162. 
27 Floydd v Cheney, [1970] Ch. 602. 
28 Finlayson v Turnbull, 1997 S.L.T. 613. 
information of the partnerships’ business for opening and operating their own business in future. It 
was decided that in a partnership enterprise, the fiduciary duty prohibits any partners from 
appropriating the files or documentations which include the business information belonging to the 
partnership. The important point is that even though in professional partnerships, like solicitors 
firms, each individual case or project is handled by appointed lawyer(s), however, the high level 
trust relationship between partners does not allow any partner to exclusively control the 
information of the businesses; in other words, no matter which partner control the partnership 
business, the commercial opportunities in each business are equally owned by the partnership.  
 
In the second place, the duty of loyalty also indicates that the managing partners who substantially 
handled the business must disclose all related information to the copartners, especially in the 
circumstance where one partner purchases the partnership interest of another. In the English case 
Law v Law (1905)29, the two Laws, William Law & James Law were the co-partners of a 
partnership in Yorkshire since 1874, latterly, the former moved to live in London and gradually 
participated little in the partnership’s business. In March 1900, William decided to transfer his 
interest to James and retire from the partnership, then he accepted the offer from James which 
proposed the transaction in the price of £21000 without any investigation of the account of the 
enterprise. The consideration was paid to the vendor in the form of installment in July 1900 and 
1901. However, short after the second-half payment, William recognized that there were a series 
of assets weren’t told to him but known to James only, which meant that the price of William’s 
share was undervalued. William filed an action against James for compensation in 1901.  
 
The defendant admitted that there were some other assets under the name of the partnership, 
however, he denied that these assets were never unduly concealed to the plaintiff and contributed 
to the unfair payment to William, because this private transaction should be carried out in the 
principle of freedom of contract and William didn’t make any effort to investigate the account, 
business records or any other certificates of the assets and securities of the partnership, the duty of 
due diligence should be exercised by plaintiff himself, but there was no duty of disclosure on the 
                                                        
29 Law v Law, [1905] 1 Ch. 140.  
 
defendant. Finally, the court held that, the freedom of contract principle should not be the 
principal rule in the transaction between the copartners due to the particularly close relationship 
between the co-partners30.  
 
From this case we can see that in British partnership law, the managing partner or the partners 
who know more information of the business shoulder the duty of disclosing all the related 
information to the co-partners, in other words, the fiduciary relationship between the partners has 
substantially restricted the application of freedom of contract. 
 
The other requirement imposed on partners is the prohibition of conflicts of interest between the 
private profit and the sake of the partnership business. This aspect of partners’ fiduciary duty has 
positioned each partner as a trustee to the beneficiaries in a trust.31 One leading case illustrating 
this point is Bentley v Craven(1853)32, the two parties and two others were the partners of a sugar 
refinery in Southampton, Craven the defendant was the managing partner of the firm who had 
sophisticated skills to purchase sugar at a discount price. However, Craven bought the sugar at 
discount price, then sold it to the firm at market price and made speculative profit for himself. 
Latterly, the dealing was discovered by the co-partners and Bentley represented the partnership 
sued the Craven to the court claiming the unjust profit from these transactions.  
 
The dispute is that the dealings were traded in a market price rather than an unreasonably high 
price, in other words, the co-partners didn’t suffer any unacceptable loss or cost from the 
transactions. So, should the conduct of Craven be deemed as a breach of fiduciary duty? The 
verdict asserted that although the managing partner in this case didn’t cause extra cost to the 
partnership and it was also likely that if the same deals were handled by other partners whose 
commercial skills and knowledge were quite ordinary, the trade might be contracted at the same 
market price or even higher, however, Craven has still violated the fiduciary duty. 33  
                                                        
30 Ibid. 
31 Morse (n 26) 166-167. 
32 Bentley v Craven, (1853) 18 Beav 75. 
33 Ibid. 
 According to above judicial practice, the defendant’s speculative profit was ordered to return to 
the co-partners. And the importance of this case was also pointed by the court: in a partnership, if 
the managing partner(s) realize a benefit from his/her excellent skills or efforts and expect to make 
extra bonus from the transactions, he or she must account for it to the co-partners. The fiduciary 
law doesn’t allow the agent to conceal the facts of the deals managed by him/her, neither can the 
agent make private or secret profit from the deals without any statement to the copartners.  
 
In British fiduciary law, the misusing or appropriating the business opportunities belonging to the 
principals are also deemed as a breach of duty of loyalty. The leading cases such as Boardman v 
Phipps(1967), Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver(1967) and Industrial Development Consultants Ltd 
v Cooley(1972)34 in the field of commercial law have established a rule that any agents (e.g 
trustees, directors) who are able to acquire business information or privately approach the dealers, 
should not 1) put himself in the conflict position to the principal’s interest and make profit by 
using the information neither 2) compete with the principals to use the opportunities for personal 
interests. This equitable rule was regarded as inexorable and the agent’s profit must be returned to 
the principals, no matter the agent is bona fide or not. In other words, the agent cannot obtain extra 
profit from the dealing, unless it is approved by the principals. Although the practical rule of this 
was developed and summarized from above cases in corporate law and trust law, there seems little 
reason why this rule can be rejected in partnership law. The partners of partnerships are prohibited 
to use the opportunities of the enterprise to make private profit without the consent of co-partners.  
 
In terms of venture capital limited partnerships, however, the similar trend that loosening the 
fiduciary duties in the law of business organizations also exist in the modern partnership law of 
UK. For instance, although there are fewer judicial practices clearly permitting the full waiver of 
fiduciary duties via the drafting of contractual terms, the scope of fiduciary duties, which can be 
modified by contractual terms, has been a basic principle.35 Specifically, in consideration of the 
high costs involved in both the contracting and judicial practices of fiduciary duties, the rigid 
                                                        
34 [1967] 2 AC 46, [1967] 2 AC 134 and [1972] 1 WLR 443. 
35 Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205. 
fiduciary duties of general partners in the UK’s venture capital funds have been criticized, and it is 
argued that alternative mechanisms such as reputation36 and contractual adjustment37 have been 
playing an important role in preventing opportunism. 
 
5 The Limits of Fiduciary Duties in Business Organizations: Practical Implications  
 
The Uncertainty in Application of Fiduciary Duties 
 
Although the fiduciary duty regime as the default rules can save on transaction costs by allocating 
a part of the legislating power to the judicial system, which can make negotiation among the 
parties of the firm more efficient, every legal institution is a double-edged sword, the fiduciary 
duty rules of commercial organizations still have inherent shortcomings. Taking the securities 
investment fund (such as unit trusts in the UK or mutual funds in the US) as an example, the duty 
of care requires the trustees to manage the trust assets prudently and professionally in the interests 
of beneficiaries exclusively. In the instance where a loss occurs and beneficiaries or investors file 
a lawsuit, it may be too difficult for a judge to decide whether or not a specific investment 
decision was reasonable. Moreover, owing to the time-consuming process of judicial review, even 
though the court provides adequate remedies for investors, the loss in specific investments 
involving stock market indexes, for instance, or financial derivatives, may still be exacerbated 
before the eventual adjudication.  
 
Furthermore, imposing strict fiduciary duties on some given business organizations may decrease 
the advantages of such given investment entities; for instance, in a family partnership, the 
                                                        
36 Joseph A. MaCahery and Erik P.M. Vermeulen, ‘Limited Partnership Reform in the United 
Kingdom: A Competitive, Venture Capital Oriented Business Form’ (2004) 5 European Business 
Organization Law Review 79, 82. 
37 A recent case decided by the High Court of Justice has shown that the duties of the general partner 
in a limited partnership can be narrowed down by contractual provisions in a limited partnership 
agreement (LPA), as the extent of fiduciary duties varies from case to case in the particular 
consideration of the current business of the partnership. Inversiones Frieira SL v Colyzeo Investors II 
LP [2012] EWHC 1450. 
over-strict fiduciary duty may undermine kinship and trust between family members.38 In terms 
of the limited partnership, in a general sense, limited partners do not manage the firm, which 
justifies the strict fiduciary burden on general partners. Because of the existence of unlimited 
liability on the general partners, however, the costs and benefits of the managing partners’ 
fiduciary duties should still be balanced. Specifically, limited partnerships are usually used in 
risky investments, the flexibility of decision-making is essential for successful investment. In sum, 
the liability mechanism and governance structure within the limited partnership can be more 
efficient than the fiduciary duty system. As shown in this article, the case law of the US and UK 
have permitted the waiver of fiduciary duty in PE limited partnerships.  
 
In addition, the judicial attitudes towards directors’ fiduciary duty provisions included in the 
articles of association in public corporations also still differ in different regions. The US courts, 
for example, tend to regard public corporations as ‘public contracts’. 39 Therefore, the waiver of 
fiduciary duties as freedom to contract may be restricted or invalidated by judicial review.40 As 
for the UK law, though the Companies Act 2006 (CA2006) does not allow any provisions 
amending directors’ liability in the articles of association, 41 directors’ liabilities in certain 
circumstances may be mitigated or waived by judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis. 42  
 
The Barrier to the Legal Transplantation of Fiduciary Duties 
 
Aside from the uncertainties in judicial interpretation, the legal transplantation of fiduciary duty 
regime across jurisdictions is also problematic. Some comparativists have stated that so far in 
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40 Ibid. 
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transitional economies, the legal reforms brought about by the authorities were mainly focused on 
the written laws in European or US legal systems, while reforms of the judicial system was still 
unsatisfactory.43 Even though the judicial practices were introduced in some emerging markets, 
the limited experience in coping with decision-making in business organizations (e.g., Poland)44 
and politically driven adjudications (e.g., Russia)45 can hardly provide adequate protection for 
investors.  
 
What’s more, the primary function of fiduciary duties in business law is providing flexible and 
efficient protection for investors, whereas in some transitional jurisdictions the functions of 
commercial laws are not protective but more political.46 The over-dependence on transplanting 
the fiduciary duties in other jurisdictions may cause high social costs and the protective functions 
of fiduciary laws may be substantially weakened. It is obvious that the costs of any legal 
transplantation would not be nil, thus a mixture of indigenous or alternative solutions may be more 
efficient to the same legal problem in a given society and the convergence or divergence in legal 
transplantation is determined by the competition between different regimes.47 In a nutshell, the 
limitations of the uncertainty and impracticality of fiduciary duties may lead to alternative legal 
reforms as more cost-efficient and favorable solutions to agency problems in a given jurisdiction 
out of the common-law world. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The role of fiduciary duties in business organization laws is significant, but also is changing 
through time. The evolution of the law of limited partnerships in the US and UK provides a useful 
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and practical evidence showing how the economic function of fiduciary duty regime can be well 
performed by other legal arrangements, such as personal liability of the managing person or close 
trusteeship between contractual parties. Such a trend in business organization law also suggests 
that the protective effect of fiduciary duties is not a free lunch and that the judicial and regulatory 
enforcement of fiduciary duties in various forms of business organizations will cost huge social 
resources. Therefore, it should be borne in mind that fiduciary duty as a judicial technique or 
external protection for investors also has its own limits. Any abuse of using fiduciary law in 
practice may lead to inefficiency. The gross efficiency in any form of enterprise cannot be reached, 
unless a balance between internal protection mechanism and external protection mechanism for 
investors is struck. 
 
 
